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What can be done about the private health sector in
low-income countries?*
Anne Mills,1 Ruairi Brugha,2 Kara Hanson,3 & Barbara McPake2
Abstract A very large private health sector exists in low-income countries. It consists of a great variety of providers and is used by a
wide cross-section of the population. There are substantial concerns about the quality of care given, especially at the more informal end
of the range of providers. This is particularly true for diseases of public health importance such as tuberculosis, malaria, and sexually
transmitted infections. How can the activities of the private sector in these countries be influenced so that they help to meet national
health objectives? Although the evidence base is not good, there is a fair amount of information on the types of intervention that are
most successful in directly influencing the behaviour of providers and on what might be the necessary conditions for success. There is
much less evidence, however, of effective approaches to interventions on the demand side and policies that involve strengthening the
purchasing and regulatory roles of governments.
Keywords Health services/supply and distribution; Private sector; Marketing of health services; Quality of health care; Legislation,
Health; Consumer advocacy; Developing countries (source: MeSH, NLM ).
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Voir page 329 le re´sume´ en franc¸ais. En la pa´gina 329 figura un resumen en espan˜ol.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a considerable growth of interest
in the activities of providers in the private health sector in low-
income countries, and in how policy-makers might best
capitalize on the accessibility and popularity of this sector (1–
3). However, the evidence is limited as to which approaches
work best. There have been many references to social
marketing, accreditation, franchising and contracting, but
much of the experience is documented only in the unpublished
literature or has been gained in relatively small projects (4, 5).
The aim of the present paper is to consider how the activities of
the private health sector in low-income countries can be
influenced so that they help to meet national health objectives.
Characteristics of the private health sector
in low-income countries
The private health sector may be defined as comprising all
providers who exist outside the public sector, whether their
aim is philanthropic or commercial, and whose aim is to treat
illness or prevent disease. They include large and small
commercial companies, groups of professionals such as
doctors, national and international nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and individual providers and shopkeepers. The services
they provide include hospitals, nursing and maternity homes,
clinics run by doctors, nurses, midwives and paramedical
workers, diagnostic facilities, e.g. laboratories and radiology
units, and the sale of drugs from pharmacies and unqualified
static and itinerant drug sellers, including general stores.
In practice there is a considerable overlap between the
public and private sectors (6). Staff employed in the public
sector may also practise privately, either on their own account
or working for owners of private facilities. This may be legal or
may not be strictly legal or controlled. Public hospitals may
operate their own private wards and manage the income from
them, or may allow work for private gain on their premises, as
when doctors admit private patients and are paid directly by
them. If public services become heavily dependent on fee
income, as, for example, in China (7), there may be little to
distinguish them from private enterprises that operate in the
interest of their owners rather than in that of the general public.
The private sector represents a resource that is available
and used even in the poorest countries and among lower
income groups (8). For example, the majority of malaria
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episodes in sub-Saharan Africa are initially treated by private
providers, mainly through the purchase of drugs from shops
and peddlers (9, 10). For some diseases of high priority, e.g.
malaria, tuberculosis and sexually transmitted infections in the
many countries where the public infrastructure is limited,
prevention and treatment cannot be substantially scaled up
without considering how best to make use of contacts with the
private sector.
However, the effectiveness of private services is often
very low. Poor treatment practices have been reported for
diseases such as tuberculosis (11, 12) and sexually transmitted
infections (5, 13), with implications not only for the individuals
treated but also for disease transmission and the development
of drug resistance. Why, then, are private services so popular?
One reason is that they are often cheap because they are
adjusted to the purchasing power of the client, as when partial
doses of drugs are sold. In Sierra Leone, for example, the price
of purchased drugs was almost a third of the cost of treatment
at a public health centre (14). Another reason for the popularity
of private services is that they are often accessible: drugs are
sold through general retail outlets with convenient opening
hours.
The use of the more expensive private services, or
treatment for chronic conditions, can result in households
being unable to afford other vital requirements. Over 10% of
the income of the poorest quintile of the population is often
spent on medical care, as found in a study in Sierra Leone (14).
Moreover, rapidly growing private services compete with the
public sector for trained human resources. This both weakens
the public services and opens possibilities of using private
sector resources to promote public health objectives.
How can the operation of the private market be
improved? The current situation is the result of interaction
between consumers and providers. Consumers make their
decisions on which providers to use on the basis of price,
available income, their knowledge of different providers, and
their preferences for services with different characteristics,
particularly relating to quality. Providers are influenced bywhat
it costs them to provide services, what they can charge, their
own knowledge, and the regulatory environment. Efforts to
improve the current situation should influence demand or
supply directly or should seek to restructure the overall
environment.
Influencing consumers
Consumers in low-income countries face a number of
problems in relation to the private sector. They often lack
knowledge about appropriatemeans of treating and preventing
illness. This translates into low levels of demand for effective
disease control measures. They are dependent on providers for
information, for example on the interpretation of their
symptoms, and this can make them vulnerable to self-
interested behaviour by providers. Consumers are usually
unable to assess the technical quality of services, with the result
that they place more weight on aspects of perceived quality,
such as the interpersonal skills of providers and the comfort of
the environment inwhich treatment occurs, both ofwhichmay
be unrelated to technical competence. They may, therefore, be
more exposed to inadequately qualified practitioners providing
care of very poor quality. Consumers with low incomes may
choose to use practitioners in the informal sector, such as
unqualified providers and drug sellers, rather than higher-
quality private providers. However, very little is known about
the patterns of health-seeking behaviour in different socio-
economic groups or about the extent to which the poor rely
more than the better-off on low-quality private providers (15).
Relatively few approaches to supporting consumers in
their use of the private sector have been tested. They tend to
have one or more of the following aims: to improve consumer
information; to make services or products more affordable
through some form of subsidy; and to create new institutions
that give consumers greater authority to challenge care of poor
quality.
Social marketing
Social marketing is increasingly being used to tackle lack of
consumer information. It uses commercial marketing techni-
ques to stimulate demand for effective public health
interventions that are then sold, often through the private
sector. Social marketing organizations are often non-profit
firms or associations, but the products tend to be distributed
through various for-profit outlets and nongovernmental
organizations. Social marketing has been applied to such
diverse interventions as family planning, the treatment of
sexually transmitted infections, the use of insecticide-treated
mosquito nets, hand-washing andwater purification. Although
important increases in coverage have been achieved for a wide
range of socially marketed interventions, there remains much
debate about whether social marketing strengthens the private
sector by creating new demand that spills over into demand for
full-priced commodities or whether, instead, it crowds out the
private commercial sector (16). The lack of evidence is
exacerbated by the fact that social marketing projects tend to
measure their success in terms of sales of their own branded
products rather than by the development of the market as a
whole.
By providing subsidized commodities, social marketing
also helps to increase affordability. The level of subsidy differs
enormously between projects and types of intervention;
however, the price of a product often covers its cost, leaving
the promotion and distribution costs to be covered by public,
usually donor, funds. This form of subsidy is usually
untargeted, raising the possibility that a substantial share leaks
to people who would otherwise have purchased the product at
the full price. Furthermore, other measures are needed to
ensure access for very poor people who cannot afford even the
subsidized product.
There is limited experience with the branding of services
and the use of social marketing to promote them, e.g. in
reproductive health (3). However, the consequences of the
social marketing of services may be quite different from those
of commodities because of the less flexible nature of the supply
of services. Increasing demand for commodities is likely to be
met with an increase in supply, but qualified staff are in shorter
supply and long periods inevitably elapse while new personnel
are trained. This means that an increase in demand is likely to
result in higher prices and/or staff being drawn from the public
sector. In both cases the overall effect on utilization is
diminished. To the extent that the social marketing of services
succeeds in reorienting demand towards the suppliers of
services of higher (technical) quality, the incentives to provide
high quality can be expected to strengthen in the long run. In
the meantime, however, there is a risk that the tendency for
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markets to be segmented along income/quality lines will be
reinforced, with the usual consequences for equity.
Use of vouchers
Targeted distribution of vouchers that are exchanged for
services or products from a private provider is an alternative to
an untargeted subsidy at the point of purchase. Vouchers
interfere less with the supply side, since providers continue to
sell at the market price. They also allow consumers to exercise
choice over where they receive services: the money follows the
patients, and providers therefore have to compete for business,
making them more sensitive to the preferences of patients. A
voucher system nevertheless needs amechanism for determin-
ing who qualifies for subsidy, and vouchers can be traded
among individuals, making it more difficult to ensure that
subsidies reach the target group. Voucher systems have been
used for targeting insecticide-treated mosquito nets in the
United Republic of Tanzania (17) and sexual health services for
sex workers in Nicaragua (2), but their potential remains
underexploited.
Consumer protection
Consumers often lack the institutional structure to seek redress
when they have been victims of medical malpractice or
negligence. One example of the creation of such a structure
was the incorporation of private medical practice into the
Indian Consumer Protection Act of 1986. A number of
improvements followed, but other complementary measures
are needed in order to confront the poor quality of care in the
private sector (18).
There are other potential approaches to strengthening
the position of consumers in private medical markets, about
which even less information is available. For example, direct
consumer education could help to inform patients about what
constitutes care of good quality for a range of commonmedical
procedures; information about prices could help patients when
they choose providers; and social marketing approaches could
prove useful in publicizing such information. Although
regulation and accreditation are, strictly speaking, provider-
side interventions, they play an important role in sending clear
and transparent signals to consumers about which providers
are registered and meet minimum requirements in terms of
structure, equipment and staff.
Influencing private providers
Governments should use a range of approaches when working
with private providers rather than relying on single strategies.
Training
The improvement of knowledge and skills is a necessary
starting point. Most private providers receive no guidance
from the public sector on diagnosis and treatment (19).
Consequently, their practices are determined more by biased
information from pharmaceutical companies (20, 21).
Although imaginative ways of disseminating evidence-based
information to private providers are insufficient on their own
to change behaviour, they offer a potentially affordable strategy
that has been little explored (5). Training is central to most
approaches. For example, it has improved the diagnosis and
counselling practices of informal providers in India (22), the
provision of antimalarials by shopkeepers in Kenya (23), and
the management of diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections
by private medical practitioners in Mexico (24). However,
improvements attributable to one-off training may be short-
lived (25), and follow-up and supervision in the private sector is
difficult for an underresourced public sector unable to
supervise its own health workers.
Regulatory and participative approaches
The private ambulatory sector can be highly competitive, so
that success in meeting users’ perceived needs and retaining
clientele is vital to the economic survival of providers (8, 26).
Private providers may use treatments they know to be
ineffective because of actual or perceived user demand (25,
27). The involvement of service users in the training of
providers has successfully reinforced improvements in
practice (28). However, private providers may engage in what
they know to be unethical practices in order to maximize
income (26, 29). Regulatory approaches, including consumer
protection legislation (18), have helped to highlight these
practices but have done little to control them (26). In Pakistan
the deregistration of paediatric antimotility drugs for diarrhoea
led to their substitution by more dangerous adult formulations
(30). An approach that could have greater impact in the longer
term is for the public sector to work with providers’
representative organizations in order to promote professional
ethics, building on non-financial incentives such as the desire
of providers for social recognition and prestige (31, 32). Such
organizations could also be used to support measures
promoting rational drug prescribing, which have mainly been
applied in the public sector (33).
Resourcing providers
Private providers may lack access to essential diagnostic
services and treatments. One approach has been to provide
them with prepackaged drugs for common conditions such as
malaria and sexually transmitted infections. However, perverse
outcomes can occur; for example, it has been reported that
pharmacists supplied with prepackaged antimalarials subse-
quently marketed them to street vendors who then sold
individual tablets at higher unit cost to the poorest customers
(34, 35). Such strategies therefore require a high level of
monitoring. They may, moreover, be difficult to justify where
the supply of drugs to the public sector is poor. In Hyderabad,
India, private providers refer patients with chronic cough to
the local hospital for laboratory investigations; most patients
do not have tuberculosis and are asked to report back to the
referring doctors with their results (36). The doctors welcome
participation since the scheme supports their client base. It
already helps to improve diagnostic skills and may have the
potential to evolve into a more formal certification or
accreditation scheme.
Comprehensive approaches
Some successful projects have adopted a comprehensive
approach, improving providers’ knowledge and skills, assisting
users to recognize and demand good care, and helping
providers to apply what they have learnt. In the Clear 7 Project
in Uganda, which provided prepackaged drugs for the
treatment of sexually transmitted infections through private
clinics and shops, improved cure rates and prevention practices
were reported (37). The Green Star Project in Pakistan
improved access and increased the coverage of a wide range of
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family planning services among previously unreached women
(38). In these projects the quality of clinical care wasmonitored
by external assessment, and the project brands were promoted
among potential service users: functions that weak public
sectors would find difficult to replicate on a national scale.
However, governments should be cautious about conferring
official approval on the quality of care of trained private
providers unless sound monitoring systems are in place.
Moreover, the approval of less qualified providers is often
vehemently opposed by professional organizations (39). The
approach also runs the risk of further segmenting the market
along income/quality lines.
Restructuring the market
Recognizing the importance of the private sector in health
system outcomes does not imply that the public sector has a
diminished role to play. Rather, attention is drawn to the often
neglected governmental role of stewardship (1, 40), without
which the private sector operates unchecked and unguided.
Governments should regulate the private sector not just in the
sense of legislating and administering formal rules but also by
intervening to alter the incentives available to private sector
institutions and thereby their activities and performance
outcomes.
Government stewardship
The concept of stewardship relates not only to the role of
government vis-a`-vis the private sector but also to a
realignment of governmental functions in the public system,
which is often both inadequately regulated and inadequately
steered towards serving a public health interest (2). By
focusing on the purchasing rather than the providing side of
the health services market, government may seek to achieve
similar ends in the public sector to those pursued through
contracting out policy in the private sector. Formal regulation
may influence the number of providers through licensing, but
the development of purchasing may create a significant new
market to which private providers respond. The separation of
purchasers and providers involves the creation of public
provider institutions with increased autonomy. These can be
expected to compete more vigorously with private sector
alternatives.
Contracting out services
Over the past decade, many countries have moved towards
greater contracting out to private providers, largely for non-
clinical services but also for clinical services (41, 42), much of
the latter having been reported in the unpublished literature
(43–47). Formal contracts are more common for services that
are relatively easy to specify and monitor, e.g. hospital catering
and the provision of commodities, whereas less formal, more
trust-based relationships are commoner for services that are
less easy to specify, e.g. most clinical services (48). Long-term
relationships have traditionally dominated in primary care (49).
This suggests that the development of competition may not be
a common outcome of increasing reliance on contractual
relationships for clinical services, whether or not the market
would otherwise be contestable, or potentially competitive.
Indeed, very little is yet known of the nature of the relationship
between purchaser and provider and how this affects the care
provided.
Regulating the market
Regulation that primarily aims to intervene strategically in the
health service market appears to be relatively rare (50). In any
case, themajor issue in regulation is implementation, which has
typically been extremely weak, especially in sub-Saharan Africa
(51). This implies that regulation is unlikely to have had amajor
impact on private providers or on market structure and
explains the widespread development of the informal private
sector. Growth of the private sector is largely determined
externally, even when enabling measures intended to support
the sector are in place (18). Experience gained in a middle-
income country suggests that important opportunities to
regulate, before the private sector becomes both politically and
economically strong enough to resist, should not be missed by
low-income countries (52). Regulation seems to be a function
of the market as well as, potentially, an influence on it.
Comprehensive restructuring
Comprehensive attempts to fully restructure the health service
market are relatively rare, especially in the very poorest
countries. In Zambia the Central Board of Health has been
created to perform the purchasing role at national level. It
contracts with district health authorities and referral hospitals,
both public and nongovernmental. The volume of contractual
business with hospitals run by nongovernmental organizations
represents a significant departure from a standard integrated
public sector approach and alters the demand side of the
market considerably. It also offers the opportunity for public
coordination of non-profit providers, whereby, for example,
the geographical equity of service provision can be increased
and the planning of coverage of preventive interventions can
be improved. Other effects of reform are constrained by the
underexploitation of the new structures. For example, contract
mechanisms permit the relationships between purchasers and
providers to mimic those of integrated systems, and health
ministry officials continue to intervene directly in the affairs of
provider institutions instead of focusing on regulatory and
other functions of stewardship (53). The restructuring
approach has yet to be fully tested in a low-income context.
Conclusions
A fair amount of experience has been gained on how to work
with private providers in low-income countries in order to
improve their performance. However, very little information
is available on influencing consumer behaviour and restruc-
turing the market. Although we have identified some
successful efforts to influence private providers, they can be
problematic. These efforts may imply sanctioning treatment
practices that are contrary to current policy and there may be
strong opposition from powerful professional groups. The
monitoring function is vital but difficult to sustain in the long
term. Successful projects are hugely resource intensive,
especially when they involve working with unorganized
individual providers. Consequently, careful judgements have
to be made concerning the relative return on investment in
improving private sector activities as opposed to investment
in a strengthened public sector. Working with the more
organized formal private sector, i.e. doctors, nurses and
pharmacists, is a more feasible starting point for governments.
In this connection, however, there is a dilemma in that the
poor more frequently use informal, illegally practising private
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providers. How to bring the informal sector into an overall
public policy net remains an unsolved problem. Training and
investment in a stronger formal sector, both private and
public, and restructuring the market so as to strengthen the
purchasing and regulation functions of government, may
displace the informal sector, but this is likely to be a very long-
term process.
The dominance of private provision in the health
systems of low-income countries makes it vital to conduct
more research into understanding and influencing their
behaviour and to experiment more with alternative strategies.
In particular, research is necessary on the success of demand-
side strategies, which could both complement and increase the
effectiveness of interventions targeted at providers. n
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Re´sume´
Secteur sanitaire prive´ dans les pays a` faible revenu : que peut-on faire ?
Il existe dans les pays a` faible revenu un secteur sanitaire prive´ tre`s
important regroupant un large e´ventail de prestataires et utilise´
par toutes les couches de la population. On peut toutefois
s’inquie´ter de la qualite´ des soins donne´s, surtout dans la partie la
plus informelle de ce syste`me. Cela est particulie`rement vrai en ce
qui concerne les maladies d’importance majeure en sante´ publique
comme la tuberculose, le paludisme et les infections sexuellement
transmissibles. Comment peut-on influencer les activite´s du
secteur prive´ dans ces pays de fac¸on qu’elles contribuent a` la
re´alisation des objectifs sanitaires nationaux ? Bien qu’on ne
dispose gue`re de donne´es satisfaisantes, il existe des informations
sur les types d’intervention les plus a` meˆme d’influencer
directement le comportement des prestataires et sur les conditions
requises pour parvenir a` des re´sultats. On connaıˆt moins bien, en
revanche, les approches efficaces en ce qui concerne les
interventions au niveau de la demande de soins et les politiques
consistant a` renforcer le roˆle des pouvoirs publics en matie`re
d’achat et de re´glementation.
Resumen
¿Que´ hacer con el sector sanitario privado en los paı´ses de bajos ingresos?
En los paı´ses de bajos ingresos existe un sector sanitario privado
de grandes dimensiones. Se trata de una gran variedad de
proveedores a los que recurren amplios segmentos de la
poblacio´n. El tema de la calidad de la atencio´n prestada, sobre
todo en el el extremo ma´s informal de la gama de provedores,
suscita una considerable preocupacio´n. Ası´ ocurre sobre todo con
las enfermedades ma´s importantes en el campo de la salud
pu´blica, como la tuberculosis, el paludismo y las infecciones de
transmisio´n sexual. ¿Co´mo se puede influir en las actividades del
sector privado en esos paı´ses para que contribuyan al logro de los
objetivos de salud nacionales? Aunque la evidencia disponible no
es satisfactoria, se dispone de bastante informacio´n sobre los
tipos de intervencio´n ma´s eficaces para influir directamente en la
actitud de los proveedores, ası´ como sobre las que podrı´an ser las
condiciones necesarias para asegurar el e´xito de esas iniciativas.
La evidencia es mucho menor, sin embargo, en cuanto a la
manera de enfocar eficazmente las intervenciones orientadas al
lado de la demanda y las polı´ ticas que entran˜an el
fortalecimiento de las funciones adquisitiva y reguladora de los
gobiernos.
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